Teaching Theology and Religion, ISSN 1368-4868, 1999, vol. 2 no. 2, pp 89–95.

Teaching Theology *and* Religious Studies Is There A Problem?

James Thrower
University of Aberdeen

Abstract. *This paper discusses a problem which is largely, though not exclusively, peculiar to the older universities in Great Britain where, in recent years, many long-established departments of Christian theology have expanded their area of responsibility to include religious studies. However, the author believes that what he has to say is not without relevance to universities and colleges outside of Great Britain which have inherited and continue to maintain a confessional bias in teaching theology and religion.*

In his book *The Problems of Theology*, published in 1980, the Cambridge theologian Brian Hebblethwaite raised the question whether, in the universities of an increasingly pluralistic Britain, theology might not be in danger of becoming but one area of study within the wider and growing discipline of religious studies. There was, he said, an increasing tendency in the universities "to include the theologies of the different religions found in the world under the all embracing heading of 'Religious Studies'" (Hebblethwaite 1980, vii). However, Hebblethwaite's fears have proved to be unfounded for what has, in fact, happened in many universities in Great Britain, and in a number of universities in the British Commonwealth, is that where expansion or rationalization of the study of religion has taken place, the tendency has been, certainly in those universities where theology was well established, simply to add "and Religious Studies" to the name of the older department without too much thought being given to what this implies. This simple, pragmatic solution to the problem of accommodating what are, in fact, two distinct approaches to the study of religion has created a number of problems and caused not a little confusion in the minds of teachers and taught alike. A second source of confusion is that some universities have so changed the nature of what is taught under the auspices of "theology" as to invite the question: What, if anything, distinguishes what you teach as "theology" from what elsewhere is taught as "religious studies"?

The confusion is, perhaps, less acute in three of the four ancient Scottish universities — Glasgow, Aberdeen, and Edinburgh — where *both* divinity and religious studies are taught, for the degree structures of these universities allow undergraduates the choice of reading for degrees in *either* divinity *or* religious studies. In my own university of Aberdeen, for example, undergraduates in the new joint Department of Divinity with Religious Studies have the choice of reading either for the divinity degrees of Bachelor of Divinity or Bachelor of Theology, or for the arts degree of Master of Arts in Religious Studies. It should also be pointed out that the Bachelor of Divinity degree in all four ancient Scottish universities is the professional qualification required of candidates for the ministry of the Church of Scotland — which means that the four Faculties of Divinity (which in Glasgow, Aberdeen, and Edinburgh, but not St. Andrews, now include Religious Studies) are also theological colleges of the established church. This is not, however, the case in England and Wales where both the Anglican and other Christian churches maintain their own theological colleges and seminaries where those intending to enter the ministry of those churches must, whether they have a degree in theology or not, spend at least one year prior to ordination. It must also be noted that since the 1960s a number of new departments of religious studies have come into being in Great Britain in universities and colleges (e.g., Lancaster, Stirling, and, most recently, in the School of Oriental and African Studies at London University). What I have to say does not, overall, apply to them.

What is new in the ancient Scottish universities (with the exception of St. Andrews) is that, in

Published by Blackwell Publishers Ltd, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

accordance with a spirit of the times, the divinity syllabus now includes compulsory courses in religious studies, and economy demands that such students (not all of which today, however, intend to enter the ordained ministry of the church) and students of religious studies (who come from a variety of religious backgrounds and many from none) be taught together in the same class (and often by the same personnel). It is here, overall, that problems arise as small departments of theology and religious studies struggle to accommodate the different methodologies involved in teaching these two subjects and to meet the differing needs of those reading theology and those reading religious studies. (Although many departments of theology in Britain today invite applications from those of all religious faiths and none, very few of those reading for degrees in theology come from other than Christian backgrounds. Students of faiths other than the Christian or from no religious background who have an interest in religious questions are more likely to opt to read religious studies, now widely on offer in almost all universities and colleges.) These are not, I suspect, problems confined to Aberdeen or to the ancient Scottish universities. They will arise wherever joint departments of theology and religion are found.

Before suggesting how these problems might, if not be resolved, at least be "lived with," and how what might seem, *prima facie*, to be a disadvantage might be turned to an advantage for both students of theology and students of religion, it is advisable to rehearse, briefly, the differences in methodology and in problematic that characterize the study of theology and the study of religion. But before doing so a word is in order about the thorny question whether theology has any place in a secular university. Here I can do no more than record my agreement with a former Dean of King's College, Cambridge, Alec Vidler, who, in his contribution to a volume edited by J. H. Plumb entitled *Crisis in the Humanities*, argued that the continuance of a specifically Christian Faculty of Divinity could only be justified if it was granted that faculties or departments of Islamic, Jewish, and Hindu theology also had the right to a place, where needed, if not in those universities where Christian theology was already well established, then in the new universities which in the 1960s, when Vidler was writing, were coming into being into Great Britain. He wrote:

> If we accept academic pluralism, we have to ask what a specifically or exclusively *Christian* faculty of theology is doing in a non-confessional university ... It can be granted that there are obvious reasons why ... throughout what was once Christendom, theologians should be pre-occupied with the study of Christianity ... But the maintenance of a faculty restricted to the study of this subject is acceptable in a pluralistic university only on certain conditions: (1) that the Christians acknowledge that there would be equal justification for a faculty of, say, Jewish or Islamic theology, if it were needed or endowed; (2) that the members of the faculty are not required to submit to any religious or ecclesiastical tests, but are appointed only on the grounds of their academic qualifications; (3) that the university is satisfied that the faculty has the same standards of scholarly objectivity as are demanded in other faculties; and (4) that the faculty advertises its Christian assumptions by calling itself, e.g., "The Faculty of Christian Theology." (Vidler 1964, 88–89)

It should be added that no British university has to date taken up Vidler's suggestion and established departments of Islamic, Hindu, or Sikh theology, despite the growing number of Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and Buddhists in British society, primarily because there has been, as yet, no demand for such departments from the adherents of these faiths.

But, let us return to the problem of teaching theology and religious studies in a single department of theology and religious studies. Theology, traditionally, has been taught "from faith to faith," which is to say that theologians have seen themselves standing within a particular religious tradition — in the West, for historical reasons, the Christian — and their task as being that of seeking to understand, articulate, and, where necessary, revise and defend that tradition. As the German theologian Joachim Wach, who became the first Professor of the History of Religions at the University of Chicago, put it in his seminal paper "The Meaning and Task of the History of Religions": "Theology has its own task in identifying its own confessional norms, and none may take this task from it. Theology is concerned with understanding and confirming its own faith" (Wach 1967, 1).

Religious studies, on the other hand, has sought to stand outside all religious traditions and to study them as objectively and dispassionately as possible. It has also sought to give equity of treatment to all traditions *including the Christian*. As Professor Andrew Walls, the first head of the Department of Religious Studies at Aberdeen — originally located in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, but now integrated into the Faculty of Divinity — was given to reminding his colleagues, the Department of Religious Studies is not the department of non-Christianity (Thrower 1995, 81–92). Further, and it is this more than anything that distinguishes the student of religion from the theologian, the student of religion does not, at least initially, seek to pass judgment on the religious traditions which he or she is studying. It was for this reason that the first generation of academic teachers of

religion — many of whom had had a training in Christian theology — sought to distinguish their approach to the phenomena of religion from that found in the faculties and departments of theology in which they taught. The theologian, as they were aware, believing that the tradition in which he or she stood was in sole possession of the truth, could not but regard other religions as little more than human attempts to reach a truth which had been revealed once and for all within the tradition in which the theologian stood. These early teachers of religion also sought to distinguish their approach to religion from the study of religion pursued in the social sciences. They did so because they saw all too clearly that the presuppositions underlying the study of religion in the social sciences were fundamentally non- or even anti-religious. They saw, as the Dutch anthropologist Sjaak Van der Geest has recently put it, that such study deprived religion of its original meaning and redefined it as something which was relevant and interesting within anthropological or sociological discourse. Religion thus became ritual, an instrument of social control, a survival strategy, a political and a cultural system, a form of ideology, or whatever. In other words it became something that made sense to the agnostic or atheistic social scientist (Van der Geest 1990). The founder of the Oxford School of Anthropology, Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard, brought a not dissimilar accusation against his predecessors in his well-known paper ''Religion and the Anthropologists'' (Evans-Pritchard 1962), and he sought in his own studies of Nuer religion (1956) to rectify this. The founders of the discipline which more often than not today goes by the name of ''Religious Studies'' wanted to be free to study religion as religion, although what they meant by that is difficult to ascertain beyond the fact that they appeared to want to leave open questions about the truth claims made by the religions which they were studying or to leave open questions concerning the nature of the reality presupposed by religion. They were not satisfied with approaches — whether theological or so-called ''empirical'' — which appeared to prejudge the nature of that reality from the outset. It was for this reason that many of them adopted a methodology first formulated by the German philosopher, Edmund Husserl and which went by the rather forbidding name of ''phenomenology.''

Husserl himself was not at all concerned with the study of religions. The problem that he sought to resolve was the problem bequeathed to philosophy by Immanuel Kant concerning the relationship of ''things as they are in themselves'' and ''things as they appear to consciousness,'' and he did so by means of by-passing the problem and recommending the practice of what he called *epoché*, a Greek term meaning ''bracketing'' or ''holding back.'' Philosophers, he said, should suspend judgment on the status of the things as they are in themselves and concentrate rather on describing the world as it appears to the embodied consciousness — a procedure which resulted in phenomenological descriptions of the human way of being-in-the-world such as Martin Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* and Jean-Paul Sartre's *L'être et le néant*. While there have been those, such as the Geraardus Van der Leeuw (1933) and Mircea Eliade (1958), who have sought to offer a phenomenological account of the religious way of being-in-the-world, their phenomenology of religion has not commanded universal acceptance among those engaged in religious studies and, by and large, students of religion who have adopted what they have termed ''the phenomenological approach'' have meant little more by this — at least in Great Britain — than the embracing of the practice of *epoché*, and the related practice of *einfülung* or empathy, and then seeing their task as being that of simply describing, in as unprejudiced a way as possible, the beliefs and practices of the adherents of the world's religions. This, they felt, neither the theologian nor the so-called empirical student of religion could do within the parameters laid down by the methodologies of their disciplines. This did not mean, however, that they denied that insights into the phenomena of religion could be got from the social sciences — far from it, but they did not regard what the social anthropologist, the sociologist, or the psychologist had to say as exhausting what could be said about religion.

The problem with this approach is that it has seemed to many students of religion, and certainly to many undergraduates, to put to one side all the questions that make the study of religions interesting and important. To others it has seemed that such an approach rests on a dogmatic and uncritical acceptance of the fact that religion is what religion claims, or that there is, as Don Wieber and Robert Segal have claimed, a hidden theological agenda at the heart of such an approach that must be rejected (Raschke 1986; cf. Segal 1983 and Wieber 1994). The solution to this problem, I would suggest, is to include in the core syllabus for the study of religion, courses in the philosophy of religion where critical consideration can be given to the truth claims made by the religions of the world. Whatever the problems religion and the practice of religion raise for those concerned with ethics, politics, public policy, and international relations, and whatever service the study of religions might render to those studying the history of art and literature, the question of belief remains of central importance for the serious student of religion. Yet it is just this question that the study of religion over the past half century has, by and large, ignored. Making the philosophy of religion part of the

core syllabus of religious studies would go some way to rectifying this omission.

Rarely, in fact, have students of religion been interested in the subject matter of religion for its own sake. Let us take as an example the work of one of the founding fathers of the academic study of religions, Freidrich Max Müller. Müller certainly had what can only be called a theological agenda, for his aim in studying the religions of the world was, at least in part, that of discovering what, in his famous lecture "A Plea for a Science of Religions," delivered in 1867, he described as "the purpose that runs through the religions of mankind" (Müller 1973, 86). Elaborating on this in his *Introduction to the Science of Religion*, he wrote, "The student of the Science of Religion wants to find out what Religion is, what foundation it has in the soul of man, and what laws it follows in its historical growth" (Müller 1878, 90). Müller also believed that the "science of religion" (*Religionswissenschaft*) had an important part to play in the formulation of the new universal religion which, he believed would in the course of time emerge from such studies. Eric Sharpe has summed up Müller's position as follows: "Müller believed that the future held the promise of a new form of religion, derived not from historical Christianity as he knew it, but from all the repositories of truth that are to be found scattered over the face of the earth." This new universal religion was, Müller claimed, "the true religion of humanity" and would be "the fulfilment of all the religions of the past" (Sharpe 1975, 44). Similar agendas can be found in the work of other of the founding scholars of the systematic study of religions whose overriding aim was to try to get at what they termed "the essence of religion" — a search now well nigh abandoned.

But religion is more than belief, as social anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and others in the social sciences have shown, and the study of religion must recognize this. The consequence is that the study of religion must become, as, indeed, *de facto* it is becoming, multi-disciplinary, with the further consequence that religious studies must give up on the search for a single problematic and a single methodology. If this appears to make the study of religions a field of study rather than a discipline, then this brings religious studies into line with what is happening in many other "disciplines" in the university curriculum today. But whatever the various agendas which today constitute the subject matter of religious studies, the methodological principle, first put forward by those who espoused the phenomenological approach, that religions be approached in as fair and unprejudiced a way as is humanly possible is still the *sine qua non* of teaching religious studies, indicating that the understanding of the social scientist must be supplemented by the understanding of the believer and the critical approach of the open-minded inquirer.

However, if religious studies is changing, so too, as I have indicated earlier, is theology, and it comes as no surprise to find that there are many theologians today who are seeking to make theology conform to the more open approach that characterizes religious studies. Brian Hebblethwaite, for example, in the book to which I have referred, sought to reconcile the different approaches of theology and religious studies by so redefining theology that it became to all intents and purposes indistinguishable from religious studies. This, of course, is capitulation, and indicates, I venture to suggest, a failure of theological nerve.

Some sixteen years earlier Alec Vidler, in the paper mentioned earlier, also sought to extend the meaning of "theology" to include not only the study of religions other than the Christian, but much of what traditionally has fallen under the rubric of philosophy. "In a pluralistic university, and in the twentieth century" he wrote, "a department of theology, divinity, religion or whatever it might be called should be more broadly based, orientated at least as much to the present as to the past, and students should not be given the impression that Christianity represents the only form of belief or way of life with which we need seriously reckon" (Vidler 1964, 88–89). So far, some might say, so good. However, Vidler was on less secure ground when he went on to defend the existence of departments of theology in British universities on the grounds that such departments were needed in that, as he put it, "theologians are uniquely qualified to raise questions that are of general and urgent human interest in the contemporary world." "It is not difficult," he continued, "to list a number of such questions which theologians should be qualified not only to press upon the students in their own faculty but also to present in a challenging way to the university as a whole," and as examples of the kind of questions he had in mind he mentioned "questions concerning the importance of persons and personal relationships, the existence or otherwise of a moral law, and the relevance of developments in science to these basic human questions" (Vidler 1964, 90). Now these are urgent and important questions and theologians have, or should have, important things to say about them — but they are not the only people in academe who have things to say on these questions and there is no inherent reason why they should have things to say that are more important than, say, philosophers, psychologists, and the representatives of a host of other disciplines. The question can, therefore, be raised whether it would make any sense to turn a faculty or a department of theology, as Vidler seemed to suggest, into what might be called a "department of big questions," for this would be to mistake the nature of theology which, as I have said earlier, speaks from

faith to faith and from faith to an unbelieving world. If the theologian has any authority it is because he or she speaks with the weight and authority of an enduring, tried and tested tradition — a tradition which the theologian believes to be the outcome of a primal revelation. Theology can have no other justification. If it hasn't this justification then it is not theology, but philosophy or religious studies and the theologian should be honest enough to say so. Bertrand Russell once remarked, in the course of criticizing certain developments in philosophy associated with the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, that when a clergyman looses his faith he abandons his orders, whereas a philosopher simply re-defines his subject (Russell 1959). I have the feeling that in some quarters today, theologians are catching up with Russell's philosophers. This is not to say that within certain defined parameters the theologian should not feel free to offer creative developments within the tradition in which he or she stands — far from it — but when this freedom is taken to the point where theology becomes indistinguishable from philosophy, religious studies, or, indeed, from literary criticism, then it loses the *raison d'être* for its continued existence. The job assigned to theology by Vidler and others could be done just as well by students of philosophy or students of literature, and this, to be fair, Vidler recognized. He wrote, "It may be expected that conservative Christian theologians ... will object to so expanded and contemporary a way of viewing a subject in which they have a vested interest. They will say that the terms 'theology' or 'divinity' should be dropped if what they until now have been taken to mean is to be jettisoned." This, Vidler concedes is a fair point, and it leads him to agree with the suggestion put forward by Ninian Smart that the term "theology" in British universities should be discarded in favor of the less confessional and more comprehensive term "religion" (Vidler 1964, 91–92).

But to espouse this option does a disservice to both theology and religious studies, for if theology is as I have described it, and it is hard to see what else it can be, then theology and religious studies need to be kept apart — at least methodologically — in academic departments of "Theology and Religious Studies." This is not to say that the two should not be brought into a creative relationship with each other. It is obvious that without the theologies of the various religions there would be very little study of religions. The study of religions is, in a very obvious sense, parasitic on the practice of religion and its attendant theologies. The point to be emphasized is that by taking courses in theology in a department that includes the teaching of both theology and religious studies, students of religion, many of whom come to the study of religion with no previous experience of religion, will find themselves in a position to learn something at first hand about the nature and practice of a religion and its attendant theology. This allows the student of religion to do fieldwork on his or her doorstep, as it were — even, perhaps, to indulge in a little observer participation — and gives the religious believer the chance to witness to his or her faith. Although it is necessary to methodologically separate religious studies and theology this does not, of course, imply that the theologian and the student of religion are necessarily different persons: in many cases they will be one and the same person approaching the study of religion in differing ways at different times — a difficult, but not an impossible task as many fine teachers in universities, colleges and schools are demonstrating today.

Peter Berger has made us aware that it is religious pluralism that poses the greatest danger to traditional religious faiths in the world today (Berger 1980, 15–31). Yet in the global village in which those in the Western world now live, short of beating a retreat into the ghetto, pluralism is something with which theologians within the Christian and, indeed, in other religious traditions, will have to come to terms. It is here that the study of religions has a role to play within departments which until recently specialized almost exclusively in teaching traditional Christian theology and in departments operating out of colleges and universities with an openly (and sometimes, alas, not so openly) confessed Christian bias, for if the study of religion needs theology, theology needs the study of religions. In the face of pluralism, as Wilfred Cantwell Smith has argued in his book *Towards a World Theology*, normative religious thought must, in the future, be informed by the faiths of all mankind (Smith 1981). A general understanding of religions, and indeed of nonreligious ideologies, is also something of a necessity from a secular point of view in the contemporary world as Beckford and Luckmann have argued: "In the modern planetary situation it is not possible simply to put religions into ... a ghetto. Societies, religions, secular ideologies and ... individuals must construct at least a sketch of a general theory of their and others existence. In brief the global city is a place where each group must possess a map" (Beckford and Luckmann 1989, 19). In the shrinking world in which we now live no greater task confronts the theologian, in whatever religious tradition he or she stands, than that of offering an adequate theology of religions, and it is here that religious studies has a crucial role to play, for the study of religions, carried out in that nonpolemical and unprejudiced way that has characterized its approach to the understanding of religions since its inception, can provide the theologian — of whatever faith — with the knowledge necessary for the fulfilment of that task. Further, although the student of religions cannot

take part in interfaith dialogue for the simple reason he or she has no faith to share, it can prepare the way for such discussion by trying to ensure that those taking part have an adequate and accurate understanding of the beliefs of others — and even, perhaps, of their own.

But it is not only in providing a basis for a theology of religions or for interfaith dialogue that religious studies can be of service to theology. Theology itself could well find itself enriched by contact with religions outside of its own tradition. This was the conclusion, for example, that Keith Ward came to at the end of his book *Religion and Revelation* (1994). Having faced fairly and squarely the fact that many other religions besides his own laid claim to revelation, and having displayed, incidentally, a more than surface acquaintance with religions other than his own, he did not dismiss these claims outright, but saw the different world religions as possessing their own insights into the truth — even though, as a Christian, he held fast to the belief that the Christian doctrine of salvation through the redeeming life and death of Jesus of Nazareth offered something not offered by any other religion (Ward 1994, 335–343). The recent work of David Tracy and Frank Reynolds in comparative philosophy of religion is another example of the way forward for theology in today's world (1990, 1992, 1994). Some years ago now another theologian, Harvey Cox, in a book called *Turning East* (1979), made a very personal point about the fruitful interchange between theology and the study of religion and I would like to end with it for it sums up the exciting possibilities that religious studies can offer to theology. Describing how his spiritual life was transformed by what began as a piece of religious studies research into the motives of those who were joining the many neo-oriental cults to be found in the America of the 1960s, he wrote:

> In the previous stages of participation/observation research, I had always continued to be more of an observer than a participant . . . I was still asking what it all meant for other people, for the church, or for Western society. I was not asking what it meant for me . . . .
>
> Then something I had not anticipated happened . . . While wondering what kind of personal void an Orientally derived spiritual discipline might fill in someone's life, I discovered something that filled a previously unnoticed void in my own . . . I did not become a convert [he continues]. I did not shave my head, adopt an exclusively brown-rice diet or take up public chanting and drumming. In the course of my investigation, however, I became aware that many of the hopes and hungers that motivate people to turn toward the East were not just observable in others: they were also present in me. I believe, in fact, that nearly everyone in our society feels them in some measure. But I went a little further. I also discovered that at least one of the spiritual disciplines taught by one of the neo-Oriental movements — in my case it was the meditational practice taught by the Tibetan Buddhists in Colorado — met a deep, if previously unrecognized, need in my own life. Although I rejected nearly all the theological trappings the Buddhists have attached to meditation, the "shamatha" practice itself became an integral part of my life. (Cox 1979, 14–15)

And a little later in the same book he wrote:

> The journey I made, while helping me to appreciate more deeply what the East has to teach us today, also made me in some ways more Christian than I had been at the beginning. My guess is that the same thing, or something similar, will happen to a lot of us before many years go by. (20–21)

To summarize: religious studies means different things to different people and this must be accepted. To argue for, and still worse to seek to impose, as so many professionally engaged in the study of religions have done in the past, a single problematic and a single methodology for the study of religions is profoundly mistaken. Students come with a variety of interests, needs, hopes, and spiritual yearnings. The responsibility of professional teachers of religious studies is to provide, so far as is humanly possible, an unbiased account of what the religions of the world believe and to show how this works out in practice over a wide range of activities — worldview, ethics, politics, international relations, art, and literature. The professional teacher should not, however, be afraid, when this has been done, in engaging with his or her students by laying his or her beliefs (or lack of) on the line and engaging in serious, honest discussion on what are, after all, important existential questions. It is here for the student of religion in departments of theology and religious studies that theology comes into play, enabling the student of religion to encounter and engage with at least one variety of religious belief and practice from the "inside" as it were. But religious studies has also much to offer those studying theology in such departments (and in colleges and universities with an inbuilt confessional base), for in the world in which we now live theology must be pursued in the context of the wide variety of religions found in the world. This is not the only possible agenda for theology and religious studies, but it is, I would claim, an important one and is certainly the only way forward for those small departments of theology and religious studies to which I have referred. The consequences for theology and religious studies to refuse to engage in the kind of creative interaction outlined in this paper will be, I would suggest, to drive what could be a central subject in the curriculum of humane learning into an irrelevant backwater. To argue that to espouse the sort

of program that I have outlined somehow degrades the academic status of religious studies, as has been argued, is to play into the hands of those for whom the word ''academic,'' with its suggestion of remoteness and irrelevance from life in the (real) world, is little more that a term of reproach.

References

Beckford, James A. and Luckmann, Thomas, eds. 1989. *The Changing Face of Religion*. London: Sage Publications.

Berger, Peter L. 1980. *The Heretical Imperative*. London: Collins.

Cox, Harvey. 1979. *Turning East: The Promise and Perils of the New Orientalism*. London: Allan Lane.

Eliade, Mircea. 1958. *Patterns in Comparative Religion*. London: Sheed and Ward.

Evans-Pritchard, Edward. 1962. ''Religion and the Anthropologists.'' In *Essays in Social Anthropology*. London: Faber and Faber.

—. 1956. *Nuer Religion*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hebblethwaite, Brian. 1980. *The Problems of Theology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Müller, F. Max. 1873. ''A Plea for a Science of Religions.'' In *Chips from a German Workshop*. London: Longmans and Co. Quoted in Jacques Waardenburg, *Classical Approaches to the Study of Religion*. Vol. 1. The Hague: Mouton, 1973.

—. 1878. *Introduction to the Science of Religion*. London: Longmans and Co.

Raschke, Carl. 1986. ''Religious Studies and the Default of Critical Intelligence.'' *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 54, no. 1 (Spring): 131–138.

Russell, Bertrand. 1959. Introduction to *Words and Things*, by Ernest Gellner. London: Gollanz.

Segal, Robert. 1983. ''In Defense of Reductionism.'' *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 51:97–104.

Sharpe, Eric. 1975. *Comparative Religion: A History*. London: Duckworth.

Smith, W. Cantwell. 1981. *Towards a World Theology*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press.

Thrower, James. 1995. ''Aberdeen University and the Study of Religions: 1495–1995.'' In *But Where Shall Wisdom be Found?*, edited by Alan Main. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.

Tracy, David and Reynolds, Frank, eds. 1990. *Myth and Philosophy. Towards a Comparative Philosophy of Religion*. New York: State University of New York.

—. 1992. *Discourse and Practice. Towards a Comparative Philosophy of Religion*. New York: State University of New York.

—. 1994. *Religion and Practical Reason. Towards a Comparative Philosophy of Religion*. New York: State University of New York.

Van der Geest, Sjaak. 1990. ''Anthropologists and Missionaries: Brothers under the Skin.'' *Man* 25.

Van der Leeuw, Geraardus. [1933] 1938. *Religion in Essence and Manifestation*. London: George Allen and Unwin.

Vidler, Alec. 1964. ''The Future of Divinity.'' In *Crisis in the Humanities*, edited by J. H. Plumb. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Wach, Joachim. 1967. ''The Meaning and Task of the History of Religions (Religionswissenschaft).'' In *The History of Religions: Essays in Understanding*, edited by Joseph Kitagawa. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Ward, Keith. 1994. *Religion and Revelation*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Wieber, Don. 1994. ''Beyond the Sceptic and the Devotee.'' In *Religion and Reductionism: Essays on Eliade, Segal, and the Challenge of the Social Sciences for the Study of Religion*, edited by Thomas Idinopulos and Edward Yonan. Leiden: Brill.